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AT A GLANCE 
 
Issues relating to migration have long been aspects of the discrimination that gay men and 
lesbians in Europe have experienced and attempted to challenge by using the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In this article, we critically assess the ways in which the 
European Court of Human Rights has developed the protection of sexual minorities under the 
Convention in respect of two aspects of migration: residency and asylum. We consider a 
number of issues that have been addressed by the Court, such as the extent to which bi-national 
same-sex couples should have the right to remain together in a Council of Europe member 
state, and the protection that should be extended to gay and lesbian asylum seekers attempting 
to resist repatriation to a country where they would not be free to establish a sexual relationship 
with a same-sex partner. Our analysis of the CourtÕs jurisprudence shows the existence of a 
Ôtwo trackÕ system in which the Court adopts a dynamic interpretation of the Convention in 
respect of residency but a conservative interpretation of the Convention in respect of asylum. 
We argue that this approach is problematic because, not only is it inconsistent with the CourtÕs 
general principles on asylum, it systematically fails to protect gay men and lesbians from 
having to live in circumstances where they would have no opportunity to establish a private 
and family life. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since 1981, gay men and lesbians have attempted to utilize the European Convention on 
Human Rights (hereinafter Ôthe ConventionÕ) 1 to challenge discrimination against them on the 
grounds of their sexual orientation in respect of a number of issues related to migration. In this 
article we consider the ways in which the Convention organs Ð the European Court of Human 
Rights (hereinafter Ôthe CourtÕ) and the former European Commission of Human Rights 
(hereinafter Ôthe CommissionÕ) Ð have responded to complaints brought by gay men and 
lesbians in respect of two aspects of migration. The first aspect concerns discrimination in 
respect of ÔresidencyÕ that has prevented bi-national same-sex couples being able to remain 
together in certain Council of Europe (hereinafter ÔCoEÕ) member states on the basis of an 
intimate relationship. The second aspect concerns ÔasylumÕ and the refusal of certain CoE 
member states to accommodate those who have left states outside of the CoE in order to avoid 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.  
 
Applications to the Court about sexual orientation discrimination and residency or asylum 
concern a number of issues related to Ôprivate lifeÕ and Ôfamily lifeÕ. For example, in respect of 
residency, gay men and lesbians have gone to the Court to challenge immigration provisions 
that allow the different-sex partner of a national of a CoE member state to enter and remain in 
that state for the purpose of establishing a family life, but deny this opportunity to the same-
sex partner of a national of a CoE state. Furthermore, in respect of asylum, gay and lesbians 
applicants have often complained to the Court that a CoE member state has refused to 
accommodate them after they have left a country of origin to avoid suffering ill-treatment 
because of their sexual orientation or because they engaged in a same-sex sexual relationship. 
In taking complaints to the Court about discrimination based on sexual orientation in respect 
of both residency and asylum, gay and lesbians applicants have sought to address a number of 
issues relating to the private and family lives of those who are already nationals of or legally 
resident within CoE member states, as well as issues relating to the private and family lives of 
those seeking to enter into or become nationals of CoE member states. However, all of the 
complaints made to the Court about sexual orientation discrimination and residency and asylum 
ultimately concern one key issue, which is the extent to which the Convention protects a gay 
or lesbian individual seeking to migrate to a CoE member state, in order to pursue a private 
                                               
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 005. 
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and family life on the basis of their sexual orientation, from attempts by national authorities of 
CoE member states to frustrate that migration.    
 
Since 2010, building on its earlier jurisprudence in respect of sexual orientation and private 
life, the Court has repeatedly held that a same-sex couple enjoys the protection of the right to 
respect for family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private 
and family life).2 Moreover, the Court has engaged in a dynamic interpretation of the 
Convention to develop comprehensive protections for gay men and lesbians in respect of a 
number of aspects of discrimination in European societies. The Court has determined that Ôif 
the reasons advanced for [É] a difference in treatment were based solely on considerations 
regarding [a personÕs] sexual orientation this would amount to discrimination under the 
ConventionÕ.3 In stark contrast, however, in respect of issues related to migration the Court has 
shown a remarkable unwillingness to address discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation. Until 2016, when three applications by migrants succeeded in the Court,4 the 
Convention organs had not upheld any complaint by a gay or lesbian applicant concerning 
sexual orientation discrimination in respect of any aspect related to migration. As a 
consequence, Convention jurisprudence on sexual orientation discrimination and migration 
remains largely undeveloped.  
 
Our principal aim in this article is to critically analyse the CourtÕs jurisprudence on residency 
and asylum and to propose ways in which it might be evolved to enhance the protection of 
sexual minorities. We begin by providing an overview of Convention jurisprudence in respect 
of migration and sexual orientation discrimination. We then turn to examine in detail the 
CourtÕs jurisprudence on residency. We trace the development of this jurisprudence from the 
decisions of the former Commission, which denied that same-sex relationships fell within the 
scope of the family life limb of Article 8, to the CourtÕs recent jurisprudence, which has 
introduced new safeguards against sexual orientation discrimination in respect of family 
                                               
2 See Schalk and Kopf v Austria, no. 30141/04, 24 June 2010, ¤ 94; Vallianatos and Others v Greece [GC], nos. 
29381/09 and 32684/09, 07 November 2013, ¤ 73; Oliari and Others v Italy, nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, 21 July 
2015, ¤ 103. 
3 E.B. v France [GC], no. 43546/02, 22 January 2008, ¤ 93. See also Kozak v Poland, no. 13102/02, 02 March 
2010, ¤ 92. 
4 Pajić v Croatia, no. 68453/13, 23 February 2016; Taddeucci and McCall v Italy, no. 51362/09, 30 June 2016; 
O.M. v Hungary, no. 9912/15, 05 July 2016. 
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reunification and residence permits. We then turn to examine in detail the CourtÕs jurisprudence 
on asylum. In providing an in-depth analysis of the complaints brought about sexual orientation 
discrimination and asylum we demonstrate that the approach of the Court, which has been to 
declare the majority of such complaints inadmissible or to strike them out, is inconsistent with 
the CourtÕs general principles on asylum and fails to protect gay men and lesbians seeking to 
escape from discrimination in their country of origin. In conclusion, we suggest that the Court 
has approached residency and asylum complaints in fundamentally different ways and, in doing 
so, has created a Ôtwo trackÕ system in respect of sexual orientation discrimination and 
migration that is inconsistent and flawed.  
 
MIGRATION AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION: AN OVERVIEW 
OF CONVENTION JURISPRUDENCE 
 
Over the six decades that gay men and lesbians have been taking complaints to the Convention 
organs about discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation,5 the Court or former 
Commission have issued decisions or judgments in 23 such cases relating to migration. Seven 
of these cases principally concern allegations of sexual orientation discrimination by bi-
national same-sex couples who had been refused permission to reside together, on the basis of 
their intimate relationship, in a member state of the CoE.6 The other 16 cases principally 
concern complaints about decisions made by authorities in CoE member states about asylum 
applications based on alleged sexual orientation discrimination.7 For analytical purposes we 
                                               
5 For a broad history of the Convention jurisprudence on sexual orientation discrimination, see P. Johnson, 
Homosexuality and the European Court of Human Rights (Routledge 2013). 
6 X. and Y. v the United Kingdom (dec), no. 9369/81, 03 May 1983; W. J. and D. P. v the United Kingdom (dec), 
no. 12513/86, 13 July 1987; C. and L.M. v the United Kingdom (dec), no. 14753/89, 09 October 1989; Z.B. v the 
United Kingdom (dec), no. 16106/90, 10 February 1990; Cardoso and Johansen v the United Kingdom (dec), no. 
47061/99, 05 September 2000; Pajić v Croatia, above note 4; Taddeucci and McCall v Italy, above note 4.  
7 Sobhani v Sweden (dec), no. 32999/96, 10 July 1998; F. v the United Kingdom (dec), no. 17341/03, 22 June 
2004; I.I.N. v the Netherlands (dec), no. 2035/04, 09 December 2004; Ayegh v Sweden (dec), no. 4701/05, 07 
November 2006; D.B.N. v the United Kingdom (dec), no. 26550/10, 31 May 2011; K.N. v France and other 
applications (dec), no. 47129/09, 19 June 2012; A.S.B. v the Netherlands (dec), no. 4854/12, 10 July 2012; M.K.N. 
v Sweden, no. 72413/10, 27 June 2013; M.E. v Sweden (striking out) [GC], no. 71398/12, 08 April 2015 (see also: 
M.E. v Sweden, no. 71398/12, 26 June 2014); A.E. v Finland (dec), no. 30953/11, 22 September 2015; A.N. v 
France (dec), no. 12956/15, 19 April 2016; M.B. v Spain (dec), no. 15109/15, 13 December 2016; O.M. v 
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treat these residency and asylum cases separately but, as we explain below, occasionally some 
cases involve both sets of issues.8 
 
The first complaint relating to sexual orientation discrimination in respect of residency was 
lodged with the Commission in 1981,9 the same year in which the Court held that Article 8 of 
the Convention secures the human right for adults to engage in private and consensual same-
sex sexual acts without the risk of prosecution.10 The applicants, a same-sex couple comprising 
British and Malaysian citizens, claimed that the expulsion of the Malaysian man from the 
United Kingdom would amount to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, but the 
Commission rejected this claim as manifestly ill-founded. The first complaint relating to 
asylum on the grounds of sexual orientation was lodged with the Commission in 1990 and 
addressed the removal of a Cypriot citizen from the United Kingdom to the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus, where private and consensual same-sex sexual acts were a criminal 
offence.11 The applicant claimed that his removal would violate the private life limb of Article 
8, because it would disrupt the same-sex relationship he had established with a British citizen,12 
and expose him to the risk of prosecution and imprisonment. The Commission considered the 
application manifestly ill-founded and declared it inadmissible.    
 
Until 2013, all complaints lodged with the Court or Commission by gay men and lesbians 
relating to residency and asylum had been declared inadmissible or struck out. Between 2013 
and 2015 the Court did declare admissible and issue judgments on two applications related to 
sexual orientation discrimination and asylum, but found no violation of the Convention.13 It 
was only in 2016 that the Court held, for the first time, that a difference in treatment on the 
grounds of sexual orientation in respect of residency amounted to a violation of the 
                                               
Hungary, above note 4; H.A. and H.A. v Norway (dec), no. 56167/16, 03 January 2017; A.T. v Sweden (dec), no. 
78701/14, 25 April 2017; M.B. v the Netherlands (dec), no. 63890/16, 28 November 2017.   
8 See, for instance, Z.B. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6; M.E. v Sweden, above note 7. 
9 X. and Y. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6. 
10 Dudgeon v the United Kingdom, no. 7525/76, 22 October 1981.  
11 Z.B. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6. The Commission considered the applicant as a Cypriot national 
although he lived in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. 
12 Ibid. The applicant also invoked Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. For a discussion of this case, 
see below. 
13 M.K.N. v Sweden, above note 7; M.E. v Sweden, above note 7. 
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Convention.14 The same year, the Court found a violation of the Convention in two further 
cases relating to residency15 and asylum.16 
 
 [Figure 1] 
 
Figure 1 shows the number of applications addressed by the Court and former Commission in 
respect of issues relating to sexual orientation discrimination and migration, in comparison to 
applications concerning all other sexual orientation discrimination issues. As Figure 1 shows, 
the number of applications relating to migration remained stable between 1981 and 2000, with 
three applications per decade, while slightly increasing between 2000 and 2009, reaching the 
number of five complaints in that period. This upward trend, however, rapidly escalated 
between 2010 and 2017 when, significantly, applications lodged about sexual orientation 
discrimination in respect of migration outnumber applications lodged about all other sexual 
orientation discrimination issues. Moreover, the number of applications about sexual 
orientation discrimination in respect of migration during this seven-year period equals the total 
number of similar complaints made in the three previous decades. This recent ÔspikeÕ in 
applications is due to an increase in applications made by asylum seekers, which account for 
11 of the 12 applications relating to sexual orientation discrimination and migration lodged 
with the Court during the last seven years.  
 
The increase in applications to the Court during the last seven years by gay and lesbian asylum 
seekers Ð which are usually made by individuals from a country of origin in which same-sex 
sexual acts are a criminal offence Ð may be explained by a number of inter-related factors, such 
as the lack of national guidelines to assess the credibility of migrants seeking asylum on the 
grounds of sexual orientation17 and the legal support that national and international NGOs 
                                               
14 Pajić v Croatia, above note 4. 
15 Taddeucci and McCall v Italy, above note 4. 
16 O.M. v Hungary, above note 4. 
17 For an overview of the way in which procedures adopted in CoE member states to assess the credibility of 
migrants seeking asylum on the grounds of their sexual orientation contribute to create problematic rejection rates, 
see: S. Jansen and T. Spijkerboer, Fleeing Homophobia. Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity (VU University of Amsterdam, 2011). 
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provide to gay and lesbians asylum seekers in assisting them to make complaints to the Court.18 
The corresponding decline in applications over the last seven years concerning discrimination 
against same-sex couples in respect of residency can be explained by at least three inter-related 
factors. First, during the last two decades the Court has significantly reduced the margin of 
appreciation afforded to national authorities to treat same-sex couples differently to different-
sex couples.19 The Court has, indeed, upheld a number of complaints about forms of 
discrimination against same-sex couples20 and, although not directly related to issues of 
migration, can be seen to have encouraged CoE member states to amend their immigration 
laws to remove discriminatory provisions. Secondly, the adoption by the Committee of 
Ministers of the CoE of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5, which recommends that CoE 
member states examine existing legislation and adopt new measures in order to combat sexual 
orientation discrimination, can also be seen to have encouraged CoE states to remove 
discriminatory provisions from their immigration laws.21 Thirdly, as we explore below, the 
                                               
18 For instance, Ilga Europe Ð European International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersexual 
Association Ð supports litigation before European Courts, by facilitating training on this issue to member 
organisations and by submitting third party interventions with partner organisations. In the UK, the UKLGIG Ð 
UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group Ð provides legal support to individuals claiming asylum on the grounds 
of their sexual orientation and drafts policy proposals challenging the procedures currently adopted to assess the 
credibility of gay and lesbian migrants seeking to live in the UK. 
19 In this respect, CoE member states are aware that they may fall foul of the Convention if they enact or enforce 
legal provisions which represent Ôa predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual 
minorityÕ (Smith and Grady v the United Kingdom, nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, 27 September 1999, ¤ 97). See 
also Identoba and Others v Georgia, no. 73235/12, 12 May 2015, ¤ 65; Bayev and Others v Russia, nos. 67667/09 
and 2 others, 20 June 2017, ¤ 68. 
20 See, for instance Karner v Austria (no. 40016/98, 24 July 2003) and Kozak v Poland (above note 3), where the 
Court considered the exclusion of the applicants from the right to succeed in the tenancy of the deceased same-
sex partnerÕs home in violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8. See also: Oliari and Others v 
Italy (above note 2), where the Court for the first time found that the inability of same-sex couples to gain some 
form of legal recognition of their relationships other than marriage - in a country which at that time only offered 
marriage to different-sex couples- amounted to a violation of the private and public life limb of Article 8. 
21 The Parliamentary Assembly has also adopted various recommendations and resolutions to address sexual 
orientation discrimination in relation to migration. For instance, in the Recommendation 1470 (2000) addressing 
the Ôsituation of gays and lesbians and their partners in respect of asylum and immigration in the member states 
of the Council of EuropeÕ, the Assembly urged member states to Ôtake such measures as are necessary to ensure 
that bi-national lesbian and gay couples are accorded the same residence rights as bi-national heterosexual 
couplesÕ, and in the Resolution 1728 (2010), addressing the Ôdiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identityÕ it called for measures Ôto ensure that, where one partner in a same-sex relationship is foreign, this 
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Court has recently directly addressed discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in 
respect of residency by finding that denying same-sex couples the opportunity available to 
different-sex couples to obtain family reunification amounts to a violation of Article 14 
(prohibition of discrimination) taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.22  
 
The CourtÕs current jurisprudence on sexual orientation discrimination and residency, and 
sexual orientation discrimination and asylum, is founded on distinct and diverse legal 
principles. This is despite the fact that, as we outlined above, this jurisprudence has emerged 
from cases in which complaints relating to residency and complaints relating to asylum have 
sometimes been interconnected. Indeed, the first complaint to the Commission relating to 
refoulement and sexual orientation in 1990 was combined with a complaint about 
discrimination in respect of residency rights. In that case, the applicant advanced the dual claim 
that Ôthe implementation of the decision to remove him to a jurisdiction where he would be 
subject to prosecution and imprisonment for homosexual activitiesÕ, and the Ôforceable 
separationÕ from his British same-sex partner, amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the 
Convention.23 In doing this, the applicant was challenging both the discrimination inherent in 
United Kingdom immigration law24 and the refoulement implications of returning a gay person 
to a country that criminalized same-sex sexual acts. However, the Court has gone on to develop 
separate approaches to dealing with sexual orientation discrimination in respect of asylum and 
residency which has produced a Ôtwo trackÕ system. Such a system is, as we argue below, 
                                               
partner is accorded the same residence rights as would apply if she or he were in a heterosexual relationshipÕ. 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, ÔRecommendation 1470 (2000) Situation of gays and lesbians and 
their partners in respect of asylum and immigration in the member states of the Council of EuropeÕ adopted by 
the Parliamentary Assembly on 30 June 2000 at the 24th sitting of the Assembly; Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly, ÔResolution 1728 (2010) Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identityÕ adopted 
by the Parliamentary Assembly on 29 April 2010 at the 17th sitting of the Assembly. See also: Council of Europe 
Committee of Ministers, ÔRecommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on 
measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identityÕ adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers on 31 March 2010 at the 1081st meeting of the MinistersÕ Deputies.    
22 Pajić v Croatia, above note 4, ¤¤ 85-86; Taddeucci and McCall v Italy, above note 4, ¤¤98-99. 
23 Z.B. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6. The applicant also relied on Article 14 to claim that the decision 
to remove him amounted to sexual orientation discrimination. 
24 Ibid. Unlike in respect of different-sex couples, British immigration laws made no provision for bi-national 
same-sex couples to apply for the residency of a foreign partner on the basis of his or her relationship with a 
British national. 
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problematic because whilst the Court has evolved its jurisprudence on sexual orientation 
discrimination and residency to enhance the protection available to same-sex couples under the 
Convention, its jurisprudence on asylum and sexual orientation discrimination remains static 
and unresponsive to the needs of gay men and lesbians seeking protection.  
 
THE COURTÕS JURISPRUDENCE ON SAME-SEX COUPLES AND RESIDENCY  
 
In this section, we examine the evolution of the CourtÕs jurisprudence on same-sex couples and 
residency rights. The foundations of this jurisprudence are the decisions of the former 
Commission in respect of complaints made by one or both of a bi-national same-sex couple 
who had been refused a residence permit in a CoE member state on the grounds of their intimate 
relationship. There was a 26 year gap between the last such complaint being declared 
inadmissible by the Commission25 and the first such complaint being considered on the merits 
by the Court.26 When the Court did consider such a complaint on the merits for the first time it 
found a violation of the Convention and, as a result, instigated a sharp break from the approach 
fashioned by the Commission in its earlier decisions.27 As we outline below, the approach to 
family life taken by the Commission Ð which was built on an interpretation of the Convention 
that was hostile to bi-national same-sex couples Ð has been fundamentally transformed by the 
Court and new important protections have been established.    
 
The foundations of Convention jurisprudence on same-sex couples and residency  
 
The earliest decisions of the former Commission in respect of applications relating to residency 
and sexual orientation discrimination are particularly interesting because they constitute some 
of the first attempts by gay men and lesbians to argue that same-sex relationships fall within 
the meaning of the right to respect for family life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. 
Although the Commission had previously given consideration to the sexual relationships of 
gay men in response to complaints about the criminalisation of male same-sex sexual acts and 
                                               
25 Ibid. 
26 Pajić v Croatia, above note 4. In this lapse of time the Court considered Cardoso and Johansen v the United 
Kingdom (dec), above note 6, but the parties reached an agreement before the Court could address the merits and 
the case was struck out. 
27 Ibid. 
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discrimination in the Ôage of consentÕ,28 it was not until gay men and lesbians first attempted 
to use the Convention in the early 1980s to address discrimination in respect of residency that 
the Commission gave consideration to the broader aspects of same-sex relationships. In 
attempting to use the Convention to address Ôthe failure to treat their relationship in the same 
manner as that of heterosexualsÕ,29 gay men and lesbians were seeking to establish that the 
family life of a same-sex couple was as worthy of legal protection as the family life of a 
different-sex couple.  
 
In X. and Y. v the United Kingdom, for example, a same-sex cohabiting couple relied on Article 
8 of the Convention to allege that the refusal by immigration authorities Ôto allow the first 
applicant to remain in the United KingdomÕ with the second applicant amounted to an 
interference with their right to respect for family life.30 Similarly, in C. and L.M. v the United 
Kingdom the applicants, an Australian woman in a stable relationship with a British woman, 
and the daughter she had conceived by artificial insemination, relied on Article 12 of the 
Convention (right to marry) to challenge the decision to deport them.31 The first applicant 
pointed out that she and her partner intended to raise the child and that the Ôdestruction of the 
family unitÕ interfered with the coupleÕs right to found a family guaranteed by Article 12.32 In 
response to such claims, the Commission refused to consider that same-sex relationships 
constituted a form of family life within the terms of the Convention. In X. and Y. v the United 
Kingdom, the Commission briefly stated that Ôdespite the modern evolution of attitudes towards 
homosexuality [É] the applicantsÕ relationship does not fall within the scope of the right to 
                                               
28 On the criminalisation of homosexuality, see: Dudgeon v the United Kingdom, no. 7525/76, Commission report, 
13 March 1980, ¤ 42. On the age of consent, see: X. v the United Kingdom, no. 7215/75, Commission report, 12 
October 1978, ¤ 31 and following.  
29 W. J. and D. P. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6. The same concept was expressed also in C. and L.M. 
v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6, and Z.B. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6.  
30 X. and Y. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6. In the subsequent cases of W. J. and D. P. v the United 
Kingdom (dec), above note 6, and Z.B. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6, the applicants articulated their 
claims about same-sex relationships exclusively within the private life limb of Article 8, seeking to convey the 
idea that the protection of intimate relationships fell within the right to respect for private life secured by Article 
8. In both cases the Commission rejected these claims as Ômanifestly ill-foundedÕ.   
31 C. and L.M. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6. The applicants relied also on the private and family life 
limb of Article 8 and on Article 14. The Commission considered both claims Ôill-foundedÕ.  
32 Ibid. 
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respect for family life ensured by Article 8Õ.33 Similarly, in C. and L.M. v the United Kingdom, 
the Commission concluded that the applicants could not claim to have suffered an interference 
with their rights under Article 12 because Ôthe first applicantÕs relationship with her lesbian 
cohabitee does not give rise to a right to marry and found a family within the meaning of Article 
12Õ.34 Despite the first applicant having emphasised that the second applicantÕs interests were 
best served by growing up in Ôa stable monogamous relationship of two personsÕ, the 
Commission would not regard the three people involved in the complaint to constitute a 
ÔfamilyÕ within the terms of the Convention.  
 
The Commission applied similarly heteronormative requirements when considering the 
complaint of an applicant facing deportation to a country inside the CoE that criminalised 
same-sex sexual acts.35 In Z.B. v the United Kingdom the applicant who, as we detailed above, 
was a foreign national in a long-term same-sex relationship with a British national complained, 
inter alia, that his deportation to Cyprus constituted an unjustified interference with his right to 
respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention because it interfered with his stable 
relationship with his partner and the home and business they had set up together. The 
Commission rejected the application and, in doing so, argued that, whilst there was a 
Ôpossibility that the applicant will be subjected to hostility and social ostracism because of his 
homosexualityÕ and may Ôbe subject to the risk of prosecution for homosexual actsÕ, Ôthe 
considerations relating to respect for private life in this case do not outweigh valid 
considerations relating to the proper enforcement of immigration controlsÕ.36 The Commission 
further concluded, under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, that Ôthe family [É] merits 
special protection in societyÕ37 and, consequently, domestic authorities were entitled to Ôgive 
priority and better guarantees to established couples living in a family relationship as opposed 
to other established relationships such as lesbian or homosexual relationshipsÕ.38  
 
                                               
33 X. and Y. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6. 
34 C. and L.M. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6. 
35 Z.B. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. This passage encapsulates the CommissionÕs perspective on same-sex relationships and it was reiterated 
also in W.J. and D.P v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6, and C. and L.M. v the United Kingdom (dec), 
above note 6. 
38 Ibid. See also C. and L.M. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 6. 
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The CommissionÕs decisions on applications about discrimination suffered by bi-national 
same-sex couples in respect of residency demonstrate a remarkable unwillingness to depart 
from a heteronormative (and, some might argue, homophobic) interpretation of the 
Convention. However, the CommissionÕs approach at this time was not inconsistent with 
general Convention jurisprudence regarding sexual orientation discrimination which, until 
1999, was characterised by a refusal of the Convention organs to address any element of sexual 
orientation discrimination other than that related to the criminalization of same-sex sexual acts. 
At a time when the Convention organs were still reluctant to recognize that gay men and 
lesbians should enjoy the full range of Ôsex rightsÕ available to heterosexuals,39 applications 
relating to the Ôlove rights of same-sex partnersÕ40 were predictably met with hostility and 
declared inadmissible by the Commission (Wintemute, 2005: 189).  
 
Recent developments in the Court on same-sex couples and residency 
 
The approach developed by the Commission remained in place until 2016, when the Court 
issued two judgments on the residency rights of same-sex couples. In Paijc v Croatia the Court 
considered a complaint by a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina who claimed that the refusal 
of Croatian authorities to grant her a residence permit on the grounds of family reunification 
with her same-sex partner amounted to a violation of her rights to respect for private and family 
life under Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.41 The same provisions of 
the Convention were also invoked in Taddeucci and McCall v Italy in which the applicants, a 
same-sex couple, complained about the Italian authoritiesÕ rejection of the request by the 
second applicant (a New-Zealand national) for a residence permit Ôfor family reasonsÕ42 to 
allow him to live in Italy with the first applicant (an Italian national). 
                                               
39 Wintemute defines sex rights as Ôfocusing on discrimination against LGBT individuals because of their actual 
or presumed same-sex activity or their undergoing gender reassignmentÕ and, in relation to gay men and lesbians, 
as ranging Ôfrom criminalization of same-sex sexual activity [É] to the denial of employment, housing or parental 
rightsÕ. R. Wintemute, ÔFrom Sex Rights to Love Rights: Partnership Rights as Human RightsÕ in N. Bamforth 
(ed), Sex Rights (Oxford University Press 2005), 189. 
40 With the term Ôlove rightsÕ Wintemute addresses Ôthe denial of rights or benefits or recognition to any factually 
or legally same-sex partner an LGBT individual may have, including employment, housing and parental rights 
that the partner derives through his or her relationship with the individual.Õ (Ibid). 
41 Pajić v Croatia, above note 4. 
42 Taddeucci and McCall v Italy, above note 4. 
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In both Pajić and Taddeucci and McCall the applicants advanced claims about the need for 
protection of their Ôfamily lifeÕ similar to those made in earlier complaints to the Commission. 
Significantly, however, neither the applicants nor the Court referred to the principles 
established by the Commission, rather focusing on the CourtÕs recent jurisprudence concerning 
the legal recognition that should be available to same-sex couples in de facto same-sex 
relationships. However, the Italian government in Taddeucci and McCall did attempt to rely 
on the earlier decisions of the Commission to claim that the deportation of an alien who is in a 
same-sex relationship with a person in the host State does not amount to an interference with 
the Convention.43 The Court rejected that claim and in both Pajić and Taddeucci and McCall 
held that cohabiting same-sex couples living in stable de facto partnerships fall within the scope 
of the family life limb of Article 844 and that the treatment of the applicants amounted to a 
violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.45  
 
What Pajić and Taddeucci and McCall can be seen to represent is the CourtÕs wholesale 
repudiation of a way of interpreting the Convention that had been entrenched in Convention 
jurisprudence for several decades. Whilst incremental evolution of Convention jurisprudence 
is an inevitable outcome of the CourtÕs long-standing commitment to the principle that the 
Convention Ôis a living instrument which [É] must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditionsÕ,46 the judgments in Pajić and Taddeucci and McCall are more of a seismic 
paradigm shift that establish new and important protections for individuals who are engaged in 
a same-sex relationship with a national of a CoE member state of which they are not a national. 
Significantly, this protection extends to any gay man or lesbian who is a national of a state 
                                               
43 Ibid, ¤ 42. 
44 Pajić v Croatia, above note 4, ¤ 67; Taddeucci and McCall v Italy, above note 4, ¤ 60. See also Schalk and 
Kopf v Austria, above note 2, ¤ 94; P.B. and J.S. v Austria, no. 18984/02, 22 July 2010, ¤ 30; Vallianatos and 
Others v Greece [GC], above note 2, ¤ 73; X and Others v Austria [GC], app no 19010/07, 19 February 2013, ¤ 
96; Oliari and Others v Italy, above note 2, ¤ 164. For a discussion of the CourtÕs jurisprudence on de facto same-
sex relationships, see P. Johnson, ÔMarriage, heteronormativity and the European Court of Human Rights: a 
reappraisalÕ (2015) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 29, 1, 56-77.  
45 Ibid, ¤ 86; Taddeucci and McCall v Italy, above note 4, ¤ 99. 
46 Tyrer v the United Kingdom, no. 5856/72, 25 April 1978, ¤ 31. For a critical discussion of this doctrine, see E. 
Benvenisti, ÔMargin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal StandardsÕ (1999) International Law and Politics, 
31, 843-854.  
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outside of the jurisdiction of the Court and is engaged in an intimate same-sex relationship with 
a national of a CoE member state.  
 
Three key principles can be seen to have been established by the Court in Pajić and Taddeucci 
and McCall in respect of the residency rights of bi-national same-sex couples. First, the Court 
can be seen to have considerably enhanced the protection available to bi-national same-sex 
couples under the family life limb of Article 8. Significantly, in Pajić the Court dismissed the 
governmentÕs objection that the relationship between the applicant and her partner did not 
amount to a form of family life because the couple did not live together. The Court stated that 
Ôthe fact of not cohabiting [with her same-sex partner] does not deprive the applicantÕs 
relationship of the stability which brings her situation within the scope of family life within the 
meaning of Article 8 of the ConventionÕ.47 The implication of this is that the Court has 
narrowed the margin of appreciation available to national authorities when defining the concept 
of family life for the purposes of residency rights. As a consequence, Convention jurisprudence 
can be seen to provide significant safeguards for bi-national same-sex couples seeking to 
establish a family life in a CoE member state.  
 
Secondly, the Court has established that the exclusion of same-sex couples from immigration 
provisions available to different-sex couples can amount to discrimination under Article 14 of 
the Convention. For example, in Taddeucci and McCall, the principal issue at stake was the 
lack of any reference to same-sex couples in both immigration and family law. At that time, 
Italian immigration law did not allow unmarried partners of Italian nationals to apply for a 
residence permit for familial reasons.48 Since Italian law does not permit same-sex marriage, 
same-sex couples Ôfaced an insurmountable obstacle to obtaining a residence permit for family 
reasons.Õ49 The Court did not dispute that under Italian law unmarried different-sex couples 
would have been treated in the same way as the applicants, but it noted that only different-sex 
                                               
47 Pajić v Croatia, above note 4, ¤ 67. See also Vallianatos and Others v Greece [GC], above note 2, ¤ 73. 
48 Taddeucci and McCall v Italy, above note 4, ¤ 21. In particular, the concept of Ôfamily memberÕ extended Ôonly 
to spouses, minor children, adult children who were not self-supporting for health reasons, and dependent relatives 
who lacked adequate support in their country of originÕ (Ibid). 
49 Ibid, ¤ 83. In accordance with the European Directive 2004/38/EC, the only exception concerned Ôthe partner 
with whom the [EU] citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a Member 
StateÕ but the applicants could not invoke this provision, as the second applicant was not a EU citizen and they 
had registered their partnership in New Zealand (Ibid,¤ 44). 
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couples had the possibility of marrying. The Court held that the applicants had been treated in 
the same way as different-sex unmarried couples who had decided not to marry and, therefore, 
this failed to recognize a difference in treatment on the basis of sexual orientation. On this basis 
the Court considered whether Ôthe failure to apply different treatmentÕ50 was acceptable under 
Article 14 and a majority concluded that Ð in contrast with the earlier approach of the 
Commission Ð it was not a justifiable means of protecting the Ôtraditional familyÕ.51  
 
Thirdly, and relatedly, the CourtÕs conclusion in Taddeucci and McCall is significant because 
of the potential it provides for same-sex couples to challenge forms of discrimination that are 
created by their exclusion from marriage. Prior to this judgment, the Court had strongly 
established in its jurisprudence that distinctions based on sex or sexual orientation that are 
created by laws that restrict marriage and its rights and benefits to different-sex couples do not 
amount to violations of the Convention. The Court had consistently held that where rights and 
benefits are restricted to married couples, and where same-sex couples have no legal right to 
marry, a same-sex couple is not Ôcomparable to that of a married [different-sex] coupleÕ.52 
Therefore, complaints brought under Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8, usually 
fall foul of the Court's Ôanalogous testÕ by which it assesses whether a distinction complained 
of concerns persons in relevantly similar situations. When the Court determines that a 
complainant is not in an analogous situation with a chosen comparator then it will not consider 
whether there is an objective or reasonable justification for an impugned distinction and, 
because the Court has a settled view that Ômarriage confers a special status on those who enter 
into itÕ,53 it has been reluctant to consider unmarried couples as comparable to married couples 
for the purposes of Article 14. Although in Taddeucci and McCall the Court did not explicitly 
compare unmarried same-sex couples with married different-sex couples Ðpreferring instead 
to focus on the fact that same-sex unmarried couples had been Ôtreated in the same way as 
persons in a significantly different situation from theirs, namely, heterosexual partnersÕ54 Ð the 
                                               
50 Ibid, ¤ 86. 
51 Ibid, ¤ 93.This reiterates the principle expressed in Schalk and Kopf v Austria (above note 2, ¤ 99) that Ôsame-
sex couples are just as capable as different-sex couples of entering into stable, committed relationshipsÕ and Ôare 
in a relevantly similar situation to a different-sex couple as regards their need for legal recognition and protection 
of their relationshipÕ.  
52 Gas and Dubois v France, no. 25951/07, 15 March 2012, ¤ 68.  
53 Burden v the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, 29 April 2008, ¤ 63.   
54 Taddeucci and McCall v Italy, above note 4, ¤ 85. 
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implication is that, as dissenting Judge Sicilianos argued, the judgment is Ôtantamount to 
accepting a contrario that, within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention, the situation of 
unmarried homosexual couples is comparable to that of married couplesÕ.55 The significance 
of this is that it opens the way for same-sex couples who are prohibited from marrying to claim 
that CoE member states that restrict rights and benefits on the basis of marriage (for different-
sex couples) are discriminating against them on the grounds of sexual orientation. As Judges 
Spano and Bianku argue:  
 
if States decide to exclude same-sex couples from being able to marry, such a decision 
may have consequences when [the] Court is called upon to examine a claim of 
unjustified discrimination within a specific context that falls within the ambit of the 
right to respect for family life under Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of 
the Convention.56  
  
THE COURTÕS JURISPRUDENCE ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
DISCRIMINATION AND ASYLUM  
 
In this section we consider the CourtÕs jurisprudence on sexual orientation discrimination and 
asylum. We do so in the context of the Court never having upheld an application lodged by a 
gay man or lesbian alleging that their repatriation to a country of origin would constitute 
refoulement in violation of the Convention. As we explore below, the applicants have sought 
to develop different ways to articulate concerns about refoulement but they have generally 
tended not to focus on residency issues in asylum claims, even when these were relevant to 
their situation. The Court has interpreted the Convention as prohibiting the expulsion of 
individuals to countries where their life would be threatened in a way that would violate Article 
2 (right to life), or where they would be subjected to forms of ill-treatment in violation of 
Article 3 (prohibition of torture).57 In doing so, the Court has generally set a high threshold in 
respect of Articles 2 and 3 when assessing complaints relating to asylum and to trigger the 
                                               
55 Ibid, dissenting opinion of Judge Sicilianos, ¤ 6. 
56 Ibid, concurring opinion of Judge Spano joined by Judge Bianku, ¤ 2. 
57 See Cruz Varas and Others v Sweden, no. 15576/89, 20 March 1991, ¤¤ 69-70; Vilvarajah and Others v the 
United Kingdom, nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87, and 13448/87, 30 October 1991, ¤ 103; Salah 
Sheekh v the Netherlands, no. 1948/04, 11 January 2007, ¤ 135. 
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protection of these Articles the ill-treatment complained of Ômust attain a minimum level of 
severityÕ58 and must involve a ÔrealÕ risk related to Ôdeath or serious ill-treatmentÕ.59 The Court 
has described the assessment of the minimum level of severity of ill-treatment as relative and 
stated that it depends on all the circumstances of the case, Ôsuch as the nature and context of 
the treatment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental 
effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victimÕ.60 However, despite 
establishing this framework for assessing complaints by asylum seekers, the Court has never 
accepted the claim of any gay man or lesbian that being deported to a country outside of the 
CoE would subject them to the real risk of death or serious ill-treatment in violation of the 
Convention.   
 
The Court has disposed of applications made by gay and lesbian asylum seekers in a number 
of ways. Of 16 such cases, six have been declared inadmissible,61 six have been struck out,62 
and one has been declared partially inadmissible and partially struck out.63 The Court has 
delivered a judgment in only three of these cases and in two of them it found no violation of 
the Convention.64 The only successful application lodged by a gay asylum seeker concerned 
the conditions of his detention in a CoE member state, rather than the issue of deportation to a 
country of origin.65 Through a critical consideration of these cases we outline a number of ways 
in which the Court could have adopted a different approach that would have led it to enhance 
the protection of migrants seeking asylum in CoE member states on the grounds of their sexual 
orientation.  
 
 
                                               
58 Cruz Varas and Others v Sweden, above note 57, ¤ 83 in respect of Article 3. 
59 Z. and T. v the United Kingdom (dec), no. 27034/05, 28 February 2006, in respect of Articles 2 and 3. 
60 Cruz Varas and Others v Sweden, above note 57, ¤ 83.  
61 F. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 7; I.I.N. v the Netherlands (dec), above note 7; Ayegh v Sweden 
(dec), above note 7; A.N. v France (dec), above note 7; H.A. and H.A. v Norway (dec), above note 7; M.B. v the 
Netherlands (dec), above note 7. 
62 Sobhani v Sweden (dec), above note 7; D.B.N. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 7; K.N. v France and 
other applications (dec), above note 7; A.S.B. v the Netherlands (dec), above note 7; A.E. v Finland (dec), above 
note 7; A.T. v Sweden (dec), above note 7. 
63 M.B. v Spain (dec), above note 7. 
64 M.K.N. v Sweden, above note 7; M.E. v Sweden, above note 7; O.M. v Hungary, above note 4. 
65 O.M. v Hungary, above note 4. 
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The asylum complaints that have been struck out 
 
In accordance with Article 37 of the Convention (striking out), the Court is entitled to strike 
out an application where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that Ôthe applicant does not 
intend to pursue his applicationÕ, Ôthe matter has been resolvedÕ, or that it is no longer justified 
to continue the examination of the application Ôfor any other reason established by the CourtÕ. 
According to the same provision, Ôthe Court shall continue the examination of the application 
if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requiresÕ 
and it Ômay decide to restore an application to its list of cases if it considers that the 
circumstances justify such a courseÕ.  
 
One of the reasons the Court has given for striking out applications by gay and lesbian asylum 
seekers is that the national authorities concerned have, following an application to the Court 
by an asylum seeker, adopted measures removing the imminent risk of expulsion. In such 
circumstances the Court has often taken this to mean that the matter is resolved and the 
application can be struck out, even if the measures adopted by the national authorities do not 
entirely remove the possibility that an applicant will be deported to their country of origin in 
the future. For example, in A.E. v Finland national authorities granted the applicant Ð a gay 
man invoking Article 3 to resist his deportation to Iran Ð with a renewable, one-year residence 
permit and asked the Court to strike out the application. The applicant expressed the wish to 
maintain his complaint, arguing that the temporary residence permit Ôdid not take away the 
human rights violationÕ and that, if deported to Iran in the future, he would still be at risk of ill-
treatment.66 The Court struck out the application, noting that the applicant was not at risk of an 
imminent refoulement. Similarly, the Court partially struck out the application in M.B. v Spain, 
which was lodged by a Cameroonian woman seeking asylum on the grounds of her sexual 
orientation, on the basis that national judges had upheld the applicantÕs appeal and her request 
for asylum had to be reconsidered by domestic authorities.67 The Court reached the same 
decision in A.T. v Sweden, concluding that since national authorities had accepted to examine 
a new asylum request by the applicant the matters of the case were resolved.68  
 
                                               
66 A.E. v Finland (dec), above note 7, ¤ 26. 
67 M.B. v Spain (dec), above note 7, ¤ 21. 
68 A.T. v Sweden (dec), above note 7, ¤¤10-11.  
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A further, and sometimes connected, reason given by the Court for striking out applications by 
gay and lesbian asylum seekers is that, in light of a change in approach by national authorities 
at the communication stage of an application, an applicant is deemed to have raised matters 
before the Court prematurely. For example, in K.N. and Others v France, the Court struck out 
the case of an Iranian gay man as premature because, at the time of the decision, national 
authorities had changed the initial decision not to examine the applicantÕs asylum request and 
agreed to consider it. Similarly, in A.T. v Sweden and M.B. v Spain, the Court focused on the 
fact that, after the applicants had petitioned the Court, the national authorities had reconsidered 
their position and accepted to re-examine the applicantsÕ requests for asylum. In these cases, 
although the Court could have waited for the national authorities to conclude their examinations 
of the asylum claims before reaching a decision, it decided to strike out the applications.  
 
The CourtÕs approach to striking out applications in this way has prompted some applicants to 
make the specific request that an examination of their application be continued on the grounds 
that, in accordance with Article 37 of the Convention, respect for human rights requires this. 
For example, in A.T. v Sweden the applicant asked the Court to maintain the examination of his 
application because the failure of domestic authorities to adequately consider his claims 
regarding sexual orientation meant Ôthere were special circumstances [É] regarding respect 
for human rightsÕ.69 However, the Court decided that there were no such special circumstances 
and struck out the application. The Court also adopted a similar approach in a case that 
concerned serious issues relating to the applicantÕs family life. In D.B.N. v the United Kingdom 
the applicant, a Zimbabwean lesbian woman, alleged that, on the basis of her sexual orientation, 
she and her partner had been gang raped and had both become pregnant as a result, that her 
partner had committed suicide, and that she had attempted to take her own life. The applicant 
further alleged that she had been harassed by her family and members of the community, and 
had been admitted twice to hospital for serious injuries. Following the loss of contact between 
the applicant and her representatives, as well as the governmentÕs submission that the applicant 
had voluntary left the country, the Court struck out the application despite the applicantÕs 
representativesÕ request that Ôthe Court refrain from closing the applicationÕ.70 Although the 
Court could have continued with an examination of the application in pursuance of Article 37, 
it decided to strike out the application on the basis that the applicant no longer wished to pursue 
                                               
69 Ibid, ¤ 6. 
70 D.B.N. v the United Kingdom, (dec), above note 7. 
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her application.  
 
The common feature of all of these cases is that the CourtÕs decision was focused on the narrow 
issue of whether the applicants were subject to the threat of imminent deportation. If the Court 
had taken a more comprehensive approach to these applications it could have decided that, 
even though the applicants were no longer subject to imminent deportation, continuing with an 
assessment of the applications was justified on the basis that they raised issues regarding 
respect for human rights that required examination. On this basis the Court could have 
proceeded to consider the more general question raised in the applications of whether returning 
a gay man or lesbian to a country where they would be at risk of forms of ill-treatment gives 
rise to a violation of the Convention. Instead, it is apparent that the Court will strike out 
applications made by gay or lesbian asylum seekers resisting deportation even though, in some 
cases, whilst national authorities have removed the threat of imminent deportation, the potential 
future threat of deportation remains.  
 
The asylum complaints that have been declared inadmissible  
 
In accordance with Article 35 of the Convention (admissibility criteria), the Court is entitled to 
declare inadmissible a complaint at any stage of the proceedings when it is Ôincompatible with 
the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse 
of the right of individual applicationÕ or when Ôthe applicant has not suffered a significant 
disadvantage, unless respect for human rights [É] requires an examination of the application 
on the meritsÕ.  
 
The Court has generally justified decisions to declare applications by gay and lesbian asylum 
seekers inadmissible by stating that the situation in the applicantsÕ countries of origin would 
not subject them, if returned there, to a real risk of harm contrary to the Convention. In F. v the 
United Kingdom, the Court established a number of significant principles in this respect. The 
Court clarified that the scope of the protection afforded to asylum seekers under Article 2 and 
Article 3 does not Ôautomatically apply under the other provisions of the ConventionÕ.71 As a 
consequence, the expulsion of a gay man or lesbian to a country outside of the CoE that 
criminalises private, consensual, adult same-sex acts does not amount to a violation of the right 
                                               
71 F. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 7. 
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to respect for private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention in the way that it would if 
the country concerned was inside the CoE. Moreover, the Court established that in order to 
prove the existence of a real risk of ill-treatment on the basis of sexual orientation, applicants 
cannot rely only upon the existence of criminal laws prohibiting same-sex acts but are required 
to provide evidence of Ôa situation of active prosecution by the authorities of adults involved 
in consensual and private homosexual relationshipsÕ.72 Although evidence may exist to show 
that Ôthe general situation [in a country] does not foster the protection of human rights and that 
homosexuals may be vulnerable to abuseÕ, this is not sufficient to establish that there are 
Ôsubstantial groundsÕ for believing that a gay man or lesbian will be exposed to a real risk of 
ill-treatment contrary to Article 2 and Article 3.73 
 
Gay and lesbian applicants have attempted to utilise Article 2 and Article 3 in ways that satisfy 
the principles established by the Court in order to pass the admissibility stage. In doing so, 
applicants have stressed that deportation to their country of origin would expose them, on the 
grounds of having had a same-sex relationship, to legal sanctions, ill-treatment and, possibly, 
death. For example, in I.I.N. v the Netherlands the applicant, an Iranian gay man, alleged that 
he had been caught by a policeman when kissing a male friend in an alley and that, as a result, 
he was arrested, forced to sign a statement in which he declared he was homosexual and 
subsequently raped by a policeman.74 Similarly, in A.N. v France a Senegalese gay man 
claimed that he was blackmailed to keep his same-sex relationship secret and that, when his 
family and neighbors discovered his homosexuality, they attacked him and threatened to 
Ômassacre himÕ.75 In M.B. v Spain the applicant stated that she had to leave Cameroon after her 
late husbandÕs family discovered she had had an intimate relationship with a same-sex partner. 
All of these applicants emphasized that in their countries of origin gay men and lesbians are 
not able to enjoy family life with a same-sex partner without risking serious ill-treatment and 
abuse. The Court found that none of the risks identified in these applications met the 
admissibility criteria for complaints under Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention.76  
                                               
72 Ibid. See also: I.I.N. v the Netherlands (dec), above note 7. 
73 F. v the United Kingdom (dec), above note 7. 
74 I.I.N. v the Netherlands (dec), above note 7. 
75 A.N. v France (dec), above note 7, ¤ 8. [AuthorsÕ translation] 
76 The Court reiterated this approach in the recent decision of M.B. v the Netherlands (dec), above note 7, 
concerning the removal of a gay man to Guinea. Notably, the Court observed that Guinean legislation criminalises 
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In A.N. v France, the Court can be seen to have increased the stringency of the admissibility 
criteria for applications by gay and lesbian asylum seekers. This is because, in response to 
evidence submitted by the applicant to show the existence of ill-treatment on the basis of his 
sexual orientation Ð specifically, a medical certificate attesting to the presence of several scars 
on his body, two testimonies confirming that he had been the object of an attack, and a letter 
from the an LGBT centre in France recounting the events behind his departure from his country 
of origin77 Ð the Court stated that the two statements were Ôtoo succinct and too little detailedÕ, 
that the medical certificate was Ôundated and issued by a person whose name does not 
correspond to any of the two names of doctors on the letterhead used for its draftingÕ, and that 
the letter issued by the LGBT centre Ômerely transcribe[d] the account of the events giving rise 
to the applicantÕs departure without attesting to facts.Õ78 The Court can, therefore, be seen to 
have established a particularly high threshold for what it will accept as evidence of ill-treatment 
of an LGBT asylum seeker in a country of origin, which contrasts with the lower threshold set 
by the Court in cases concerning other asylum seekers.79 Moreover, although the Court 
acknowledged that in Senegal same-sex sexual acts are a criminal offence and that reliable 
international sources confirmed that ÔSenegal is one of the rare countries where individuals are 
prosecuted and convicted on this basisÕ, it concluded that the criminal law was not 
Ôsystematically appliedÕ80 and, as a consequence, that there were Ôno serious and current 
reasons to believe that the applicant would be exposed to real risks of treatment contrary to 
Article 3 in case of return to SenegalÕ.81 Therefore, the Court can be seen to have raised the 
threshold at which the risk of ill-treatment resulting from the enforcement of laws criminalizing 
same-sex acts will trigger the protection of Article 3.  
                                               
homosexual acts but it concluded that Ôthere are no serious and current grounds for believing that the applicant 
would be exposed to real risks of treatment contrary to Article 3 in the event of his return to GuineaÕ (Ibid,¤ 39). 
77 A.N. v France, above note 7, ¤ 10. 
78 Ibid, ¤ 44. [AuthorsÕ translation] 
79 For instance, in R.C. v Sweden (no. 41827/07, 09 March 2010) the Court considered a medical certificate 
submitted by an Iranian citizen to show that he had been tortured by Iranian authorities because of his activities 
as a critic of the regime. The Court concluded that, even though the certificate had not been written Ôby an expert 
specialising in the assessment of torture injuriesÕ and some of the scars may have been caused Ôby means other 
than by tortureÕ (Ibid, ¤ 53), the applicant had substantiated his claim and, furthermore, that his deportation to Iran 
would give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (Ibid, ¤ 57).  
80 A.N. v France, above note 7, ¤ 41. [AuthorsÕ translation] 
81 Ibid, ¤ 45. [AuthorsÕ translation] 
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In declaring these applications inadmissible the Court can be seen to have created a number of 
principles that may discourage gay and lesbian asylum seekers from commencing applications 
to the Court. Gay and lesbian asylum seekers may, for example, consider it almost impossible 
to convince the Court that the enforcement of laws criminalizing private and consensual same-
sex sexual acts amounts to ill-treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. They may 
further question whether it is possible to meet the evidential threshold set by the Court in 
respect of demonstrating ill-treatment on the grounds of sexual orientation in a country of 
origin. In short, the stringency of the admissibility criteria applied by the Court may be seen 
by many gay and lesbian asylum seekers as an insurmountable barrier to gaining protection 
under the Convention.   
 
The asylum complaints that have been declared admissible  
 
Despite the stringency of the admissibility criteria discussed above the Court has, between 2013 
and 2016, declared two applications concerning sexual orientation discrimination and asylum 
admissible. In doing so, although the Court has had the opportunity to explain why these 
applications, unlike those discussed above, met the admissibility criteria it has simply stated 
that the applications were not Ômanifestly ill-foundedÕ82 and provided no further details on its 
decisions. Nevertheless, in declaring these applications admissible the Court has been required 
to provide more substantial reasoning during its assessment of the merits of the applicantsÕ 
complaints.  
 
In M.K.N. v Sweden the Court addressed the complaint of an Iraqi national who unsuccessfully 
claimed asylum on the grounds that, inter alia, Ôhe had had a sexual relationship with another 
man and that, as a consequence, the Mujahedin was looking for him [É] and that they had 
killed his partnerÕ.83 The Court concluded that this claim was not credible because there were 
inconsistencies in the applicantÕs account, that there had been a delay in raising these personal 
circumstances in national proceedings, and that the applicant had expressed an intention to live 
with his wife and children.84 In reaching this view, the Court did not explain what further 
                                               
82 M.K.N. v Sweden, above note 7, ¤ 16. See also: M.E. v Sweden, no. 71398/12, 26 June 2014, ¤ 55. 
83 Ibid, ¤ 43.  
84 Ibid. 
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evidence the applicant needed to provide in order to prove the existence of the same-sex 
relationship or consider the difficulty of providing such evidence. Moreover, the Court did not 
consider how certain social and cultural factors may have delayed the applicant in disclosing 
details of his same-sex relationship to national authorities. In this respect, the Court did not 
examine how an asylum seekerÕs experience of heteronormative and homophobic social 
relations in their country of origin may shape their individual perception of sexual orientation 
and limit their capacity to communicate it in ways that appear credible in a European context.85 
Overall, the CourtÕs judgment can be seen to fail to grasp the complexity of sexual orientation 
and the vulnerability it might create for individuals in the circumstances of the applicant. In 
finding that the applicantÕs deportation would not give rise to a violation of Article 3, the Court 
did not therefore evolve its jurisprudence to provide protection for those seeking asylum on the 
grounds of sexual orientation in CoE member states.86 
 
In the subsequent case of M.E. v Sweden, the Court considered the complaint of a Libyan 
national who had unsuccessfully applied for asylum in Sweden on the grounds that, inter alia, 
he had married a Swedish national of the same sex. According to Swedish law, the applicant 
was required to return to Libya and apply from there for family reunification with his husband 
in Sweden. The applicant advanced the claim that his expulsion to Libya would expose him to 
a real risk of ill-treatment in violation of Article 387 and that it would amount to an unjustified 
interference with his right to respect for family life, guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, 
because he would be separated from his husband.88  
 
In respect of the Article 3 complaint, the Court acknowledged that in Libya all same-sex sexual 
acts are punishable by a term of imprisonment of five years,89 but held that the implementation 
of the expulsion order against the applicant would not give rise to a violation of the 
                                               
85 For a critical analysis of the way in which social stigma, ostracism and discrimination are considered in  respect 
of asylum cases, see L. Hooper, ÔBack in the Closet: Should Concealment and Self-oppression as a Consequence 
of Stigma, Ostracism and Deep Rooted Universal Disapproval of Homosexuality be Considered as a 'Serious 
Harm'?Õ(2017) Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law, 31, 4, 330-346. 
86 M.K.N. v Sweden, above note 7, ¤ 43. 
87 M.E. v Sweden, above note 82, ¤ 54. 
88 Ibid, ¤ 91. 
89 Ibid, ¤ 43. 
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Convention.90 In reaching this judgment the Court reiterated its established view that if there 
is no Ôinformation or public record of anyone actually having been prosecuted or convicted 
[É] for homosexual actsÕ91 laws criminalizing same-sex sexual acts do not amount to active 
persecution. Whilst reliable international sources reported episodes of homophobic attacks 
perpetrated by non-state agents in Libya, the Court stated that Ô[w]here the sources available to 
the Court describe a general situation, an applicantÕs specific allegations in a particular case 
require corroboration by other evidenceÕ.92 This reasoning could be seen to establish an almost 
unreachable evidential threshold because, no matter what ÔgeneralÕ evidence an applicant 
produces about their country of origin, gay and lesbian asylum seekers are required to produce 
evidence that shows real risk in their own particular circumstances Ð something that those 
fleeing persecution created by the Ôgeneral situationÕ in a country of origin will struggle to 
provide.  
 
A further problematic aspect of the CourtÕs judgment is its failure to consider whether, in 
disclosing his sexual orientation during any proceedings at a Swedish embassy abroad, the 
applicant would expose himself to the risk of his sexual orientation and ÔcriminalÕ sexual 
relationship being exposed to domestic authorities. The Court had noted that there was no 
Swedish representation in Libya and the applicant would have to travel to a Swedish embassy 
in a neighbouring country to finalise his request for family reunification. Despite same-sex 
sexual relations between consenting adults being a criminal offence in Algeria and Tunisia, 
and despite Ôseveral articles of the Penal Code [in Egypt having] been applied to imprison gay 
men in recent yearsÕ,93 the Court found Ôno reasonÕ to believe that in the short time-frame 
necessary to reach a Swedish embassy the applicant would be exposed to a risk of ill-treatment 
contrary to Article 3.94 Relatedly and more generally, the Court noted that during his stay in 
Libya the applicant would have to be Ôdiscreet about his private lifeÕ but concluded that this 
would not require him Ôto conceal or supress an important part of his identityÕ in a way that 
amounted to a violation of Article 3.95 This makes clear, therefore, the CourtÕs view that if gay 
men and lesbians can avoid prosecution in a country of origin by concealing their sexual 
                                               
90 Ibid, ¤ 90. 
91 Ibid, ¤ 87. 
92 Ibid, ¤ 74. 
93 Ibid, ¤ 53. 
94 Ibid, ¤ 89. 
95 Ibid, ¤ 88. 
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orientation, national authorities can legitimately repatriate them without violating Article 3. 
This view was robustly rejected by dissenting Judge Power-Forde who stated:  
 
Having to hide a core aspect of personal identity cannot be reduced to a tolerable bother; 
it is an affront to human dignity Ð an assault upon personal authenticity. Sexual 
orientation is fundamental to an individualÕs identity and conscience and no one should 
be forced to renounce it Ð even for a while. Such a requirement of forced reserve and 
restraint in order to conceal who one is, is corrosive of personal integrity and human 
dignity.96 
 
The Court rejected the applicantÕs family life claim under Article 8 as manifestly ill-founded.97 
The Court recognised that the applicantÕs relationship with his husband fell within the ambit 
of family life and also acknowledged that the applicantÕs temporary expulsion would interfere 
with his and his husbandÕs right to respect for family life.98 However, the Court reiterated its 
established principle that, in cases where family life was created Ôat a time when the persons 
involved were aware that the immigration status of one of them was such that the persistence 
of that family life within the host State would from the outset be precariousÕ, the removal of a 
non-national family member will be incompatible with Article 8 only in Ôexceptional casesÕ.99 
It could be argued that the expulsion, for a period of some months, of a married gay man to a 
country where same-sex sexual acts are a criminal offence does disrupt family life in an 
ÔexceptionalÕ way. Indeed, such an expulsion would mean that the applicant would be exposed 
to the risk of being ill-treated and persecuted and, moreover, his husband would also be exposed 
to such risk if he travelled with the applicant. However, since the Court rejected that the 
situation in Libya was severe enough to trigger Article 3, it predictably denied that the 
applicantÕs circumstances were exceptional so as to engage the national authoritiesÕ obligations 
under Article 8.  
 
                                               
96 Ibid, dissenting opinion of Judge Power-Forde.  
97 Ibid, ¤ 102. 
98 Ibid, ¤ 95. 
99 Ibid, ¤ 97. 
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The applicant in M.E. v Sweden requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; a 
request which the panel of the Grand Chamber granted.100 Subsequent to this, the national 
authorities decided to re-examine the applicantÕs case of their own motion and, as a result of 
this, granted the applicant a permanent residence permit in Sweden.101 In light of this, the 
Government requested the Court to strike out the application. The applicant, however, 
requested that the Court continue with its examination of the case because, inter alia, the matter 
before the Court had not been resolved since it encompassed not only the question of whether 
the applicantÕs potential future removal to Libya would violate Article 3 but also the question 
of whether the previous decisions of the Swedish authorities had been in violation of Article 3. 
The applicantÕs request therefore provided the Grand Chamber with the opportunity to consider 
whether, at the time they had taken their decisions, the national authorities would have exposed 
the applicant to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of the Convention. 
Moreover, the Grand Chamber also had the opportunity to assess the reasoning adopted by the 
majority of the Chamber in its judgment on the merits of the case. However, in line with its 
established practice that we discussed above, the Grand Chamber chose not to continue an 
examination of the case under Article 37 of the Convention and, instead, regarded the matter 
complained of to have been resolved by the national authorities granting the applicant 
permanent residence in Sweden. In finding that there were Ôno special circumstances regarding 
respect for human rights [É] which require the continued examination of the caseÕ,102 the 
Grand Chamber did not take the opportunity to either confirm or overturn the ChamberÕs 
approach. Consequently, the Grand Chamber can be seen to have implicitly endorsed the 
problematic findings of the Chamber and significantly diminished the substance of the 
applicantÕs claims.  
 
The asylum case that was successful  
 
The Court recently took the significant step, in O.M. v Hungary, of finding that national 
authorities had violated a gay manÕs rights under Article 5 (right to liberty and security) of the 
Convention because, when deciding to detain him during his asylum application, they had not 
undertaken an Ôadequate reflectionÕ on his Ôindividual circumstancesÕ and, specifically, on the 
                                               
100 M.E. v Sweden (striking out) [GC], no. 71398/12, 08 April 2015, ¤ 8. 
101 Ibid, ¤¤26-27. 
102 Ibid, ¤ 37. 
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fact that he is a Ômember of a vulnerable group by virtue of belonging to a sexual minority.Õ103 
The applicant, an Iranian national who had applied for asylum in Hungary on the grounds of 
his sexual orientation, was, because he had no documents proving his identity or nationality, 
detained for nearly two months before obtaining the status of a refugee.104 During this period 
of detention, the applicant unsuccessfully requested to be either released or transferred to an 
open facility, explaining that it was difficult for him, as a gay man, Ôto cope with the asylum 
detention for fear of harassmentÕ from other detainees.105 The Court upheld the applicantÕs 
claim under Article 5(1) that his detention had been Ôarbitrary and not remedied by appropriate 
judicial reviewÕ.106 The Court also emphasised that the national authorities had failed to 
consider the extent to which the applicant was unsafe in custody among other detained persons, 
Ômany of whom had come from countries with widespread cultural or religious prejudiceÕ 
against sexual minorities.107 Moreover, the Court clarified that Ôthe authorities should exercise 
particular care in order to avoid situations which may reproduce the plight that forced these 
persons to fleeÕ.108 Although this judgment is important in recognizing the vulnerability of gay 
men and lesbians who are fleeing prosecution and discrimination, it does not evolve the CourtÕs 
jurisprudence in such a way to enhance the protection available under the Convention to gay 
and lesbian asylum seekers who are attempting to resist expulsion from a CoE state to a country 
of origin.  
 
Evolving the jurisprudence on sexual orientation discrimination and asylum  
 
If it is accepted that the CourtÕs jurisprudence on sexual orientation discrimination and asylum 
requires evolution in order to better protect gay and lesbian asylum seekers, then this evolution 
could be achieved by the Court taking one or more of a number of steps. For example, the 
Court could evolve its jurisprudence by following the approach it took in N. v Sweden which 
concerned an Afghan woman who claimed that her deportation to Afghanistan would expose 
her to a real risk of ill-treatment because, in Sweden, she had started a relationship with a man 
                                               
103 O.M. v Hungary, above note 4, ¤ 53. 
104 Ibid. The Court considered the period of detention from the 25th of June to the 22nd of August 2014. See Ibid, 
¤ 54. 
105 Ibid, ¤ 14. 
106 Ibid, ¤ 25. 
107 Ibid, ¤ 53. 
108 Ibid. 
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and intended to separate from her husband.109 In this case, unlike in cases related to sexual 
orientation discrimination, the Court assessed the applicantÕs claim by taking into account a 
wide range of social, legal and cultural factors. Although the Court noted that there were no 
specific circumstances substantiating the applicantÕs claim that she would be subjected to ill-
treatment by her husband,110 it focused on the Ôparticular risk of illtreatmentÕ to women in 
Afghanistan who are Ôperceived as not conforming to the gender roles ascribed to them by 
society, tradition and even the legal systemÕ.111 On this basis, the Court held that there were 
Ôcumulative risks of reprisalsÕ from Ôher husband [É], his family, her own family and from the 
Afghan societyÕ112 and, therefore, that her deportation to Afghanistan would amount to a 
violation of Article 3. If the Court took this approach to assessing the Ôreal riskÕ of returning 
gay men and lesbians to countries outside of the CoE it could more comprehensively consider 
whether social stigmatization of and discrimination against gay men and lesbians, combined 
with state-sponsored homophobia in the form of laws criminalizing same-sex sexual acts, 
constitutes a cumulative risk that amounts to a violation of Article 3.  
 
Furthermore, in respect of the risk posed to gay and lesbian asylum seekers, the Court could 
apply the principle established in NA. v the United Kingdom that Ôin cases where an applicant 
alleges that he or she is a member of a group systematically exposed to a practice of ill-
treatmentÕ the protection of Article 3 enters into play Ôwhen the applicant establishes that there 
are serious reasons to believe in the existence of the practice in question and his or her 
membership of the group concernedÕ.113 The Court could utilize this principle to accept, for 
example, that the existence of laws criminalizing all same-sex sexual acts in a country 
constitutes a serious reason to believe that a gay man or lesbian is a member of a group 
systematically exposed to a practice of ill-treatment and, on this basis, provide protection from 
such ill-treatment under Article 3.  
 
                                               
109 N. v Sweden, no. 23505/09, 20 July 2010, ¤ 47. 
110 Ibid, ¤ 58. 
111 Ibid, ¤ 55. 
112 Ibid, ¤ 62. 
113 NA. v the United Kingdom, no. 25904/07, 17 July 2008, ¤ 116. See also Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands, above 
note 57, ¤ 148; Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom, nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, 28 June 2011, ¤¤ 217-218; J.K. 
and Others v Sweden [GC], no. 59166/12, 23 August 2016, ¤ 103. 
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In addition, the Court could draw upon a recent judgment by the Grand Chamber in F.G. v 
Sweden to reject the notion that a gay man or lesbian should seek to avoid persecution in their 
country of origin by exercising restraint in expressing their sexual orientation.114 In that case, 
the Grand Chamber addressed the claim of an Iranian national who complained that national 
authorities had not carried out a specific assessment of the risks created by his expulsion to 
Iran because of his conversion to Christianity in Sweden. The national authorities had 
considered it Ônot plausibleÕ that Iranian authorities would be aware of the applicantÕs religious 
conversion and, therefore, that he would be exposed to a real risk of persecution because of 
it.115 However, the Grand Chamber stated that the applicant belonged to a group of persons 
who Ôcould be at risk of treatment in breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention upon 
returning to IranÕ116 and that he had presented various documents showing Ôhow he intends to 
manifest [his Christian faith] in Iran if the removal order is executedÕ.117 In light of this, the 
Grand Chamber held that there would be a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention Ôif 
the applicant were to be returned to Iran without a proper ex nunc assessment by the Swedish 
authorities of the consequences of his religious conversionÕ.118 Although the focus of the Grand 
Chamber was on the procedural aspects of Article 2 and Article 3, it is clear that it recognized 
that the situation in Iran would expose the applicant to a serious risk of death or ill-treatment. 
On this basis, the Grand Chamber can be seen to implicitly suggest that, even if the national 
authorities had complied with the procedural requirements imposed by Article 2 and Article 3, 
the deportation order issued against the applicant amounted to a substantive violation of these 
Articles. This was certainly the view of five of the sitting judges in this case who explicitly 
stated that Ôthe applicantÕs deportation to Iran [É] equates to a violation of principles deeply 
enshrined in the universal legal conscienceÕ and, as such, constitutes a substantive violation of 
Article 2 and Article 3.119 The Court could apply this same principle to gay or lesbian asylum 
seekers and state that returning such a person to a country that criminalizes same-sex sexual 
                                               
114 F.G. v Sweden [GC], no. 43611/11, 23 March 2016 (see also: F.G. v Sweden, no. 43611/11, 16 January 2014). 
115 F.G. v Sweden, no. 43611/11, 16 January 2014, ¤ 8. The Chamber judgment upheld the argument of national 
authorities and found that if repatriated the applicant would not be exposed to a risk of ill treatment on the grounds 
of his religious beliefs. See Ibid, ¤ 42. 
116 F.G. v Sweden [GC], no. 43611/11, 23 March 2016, ¤ 156. 
117 Ibid, ¤ 157. 
118 Ibid, ¤ 164.  
119 Ibid, joint separate opinion of Judges Ziemele, De Gaetano, Pinto De Albuquerque and Wojtyczek, ¤ 12. See 
also the separate opinion of Judge Saj. 
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acts opens up the potential for criminal prosecution that Ôrepresents a flagrant denial of 
justiceÕ.120 
 
If the Court applied the above principles from its established jurisprudence to the applications 
regarding asylum brought by gay men and lesbians then it could establish that a failure by 
national authorities to adequately assess the risks faced by gay men and lesbians in their country 
of origin because of their sexual orientation amounts to a violation of the procedural limbs of 
Article 2 or Article 3 of the Convention. Moreover, the Court could establish that expelling a 
gay man or lesbian to country that criminalizes same-sex sexual acts, where such persons would 
be required to conceal or supress their sexual orientation to avoid ill-treatment or death, 
amounts to a substantive violation of Article 2 or Article 3. If the Court took these steps it 
would recognize that returning a gay or lesbian asylum seeker to a country of origin that 
criminalized same-sex sexual acts curtails the potential to have a private and a family life in a 
way that Ôattains a level of severity such as to constitute an affront to human dignityÕ.121  
 
CONCLUSIONS: A TWO TRACK APPROACH 
 
In this article we have examined the CourtÕs jurisprudence on sexual orientation discrimination 
and migration. In doing so, we have critically considered the jurisprudence relating to residency 
rights for bi-national same-sex couples who wish to live in a member state of the CoE. We 
have also critically considered the jurisprudence relating to asylum and sexual orientation 
discrimination that has resulted from applications brought by migrants refused asylum on the 
grounds of their sexual orientation in a member state of the CoE. Our principal aim has been 
to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of the CourtÕs approach to dealing with claims by 
gay men and lesbians in respect of these two aspects of migration.  
 
Our analysis shows that the Court has created a Ôtwo trackÕ approach for dealing with residency 
and asylum complaints brought by gay men and lesbians. On the one hand, the Court has 
recognised that the exclusion of same-sex couples from immigration provisions relevant to 
different-sex couples amounts to a violation of Article 8 taken in conjunction with Article 14 
of the Convention. The Court has, therefore, interpreted the family life limb of Article 8 in such 
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a way to secure the right of bi-national same-sex couples to live together in a CoE member 
state on the basis of an intimate relationship and, furthermore, has clarified that national 
authorities must avoid enforcing immigration provisions that indirectly disadvantage bi-
national same-sex couples. Moreover, the Court has recently held Ð for the first time Ð that the 
impossibility of having a same-sex relationship legally recognised places same-sex couples in 
a different situation to Ôheterosexual partners who [have] decided not to regularise their 
situationÕ122 and, because of this, if CoE member states make residency provisions for bi-
national different-sex married couples they must extend these to unmarried same-sex couples. 
This principle has significantly evolved the CourtÕs jurisprudence on the residency rights of 
same-sex couples and it provides scope to further address other aspects of sexual orientation 
discrimination in respect of marriage.  
 
On the other hand, the Court has never upheld the complaint of a gay or lesbian asylum seeker 
who claims that their deportation to a country that criminalizes same-sex sexual acts would 
amount to a violation of the Convention. The only successful case lodged by a gay asylum 
seeker concerns the measures that national authorities must apply to address discrimination 
against migrants on the grounds of sexual orientation in the context of asylum detention. As 
such, whilst the Court has recognised that gay and lesbian asylum seekers are ÔunsafeÕ when 
held in custody in a CoE member state with other persons that originate from countries with a 
homophobic legal system or culture,123 it has consistently refused to protect gay men and 
lesbians from being expelled to countries where homophobia is culturally engrained and 
enforced by means of the criminal law. The CourtÕs approach ignores the multi-faceted impact 
on the private and family life of gay men and lesbians who face the threat of deportation to a 
country outside of the CoE where they will be required to live in circumstances that put them 
at risk of ill-treatment or death. The Court continues to refuse to establish the principle that 
deporting a person from a CoE member state in these circumstances would be a violation of 
the Convention.  
 
The CourtÕs conservative approach to sexual orientation discrimination and asylum is, 
therefore, strikingly different to its dynamic approach to the residency rights of bi-national 
same-sex couples. It remains to be seen how long the CourtÕs two track approach can endure 
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given that a gay man or lesbian seeking to migrate to a CoE member state now has protection 
under the Convention if they are in an intimate same-sex relationship with a national of a CoE 
member state. The potential for the Court to continue to extend that protection to bi-national 
same-sex couples, but refuse to extend it to gay and lesbian asylum seekers fleeing persecution, 
seems untenable in the long-term. At the very least, this is because gay and lesbian asylum 
seekers will inevitably attempt to utilize the CourtÕs jurisprudence on the residency rights of 
same-sex couples to address their particular immigration problems. Although the issues raised 
by bi-national same-sex couples who are discriminated against by immigration provisions in a 
CoE member state, and the issues raised by asylum seekers refused asylum on the grounds of 
sexual orientation in CoE member states, are somewhat different they also have very much in 
common. Both bi-national same-sex couples and gay and lesbian asylum seekers are, in 
essence, attempting to live in a CoE member state in order that they may establish a private 
and family life without the risk of persecution and harm. Therefore, by establishing protection 
against discrimination for migrants seeking residency in a CoE member state in order to 
establish a family life on the basis of a same-sex relationship, the Court has provided asylum 
seekers with a means by which to argue that, they too, should be protected from having to live 
in circumstances where they would have no opportunity to establish a family life.  
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